Introduction
'Funny looks' from people in white dominated public spaces became one of the central experiences of British Pakistanis after the London of 7 th July 2005. In this paper we analyse the changing experiences of British Pakistani Muslims in the three localities associated with the bombers. Pakistani Muslims especially have been the focus of official, media and popular concern about 'terrorism' and suicide bombings since 2001 (Abbas, 2005) , and this was heightened by the discovery that three of the four 7/7 bombers were British Pakistanis (Brighton 2007; Kundnani 2007; McGhee 2008; Werbner 2009 ).
We begin by examining questions of citizenship and identity after the 7/7 bombings.
Since the 1990s ethnic minority identities in Britain have increasingly been conceptualised as mutable and contextual in contrast to previous essentialist models of ethnic identity (Hall 1990; Brah 1993; Modood et al. 1997; Werbner and Modood 1997) . In relation to South
Asian Muslims the focus of recent debates has shifted to a concern with how ethnicity, religion and nationality are articulated as sources of identity (Dwyer 1999a; Hopkins, 2004; 2007a; Bagguley and Hussain 2008, pp. 143-57) . Many of these recent contributions have focused on generation and gender, exploring how these complex articulations of identity take specifically gendered and generational forms (Seidler, 2007) . We seek to draw upon and assess these debates in the light of the 7/7 bombings and the reactions of Pakistani communities in the localities most associated with the bombers themselves.
The pathologisation of particular places and communities (Parker and Karner, 2010) has and cultural practices of British Pakistani communities were identified as the source of these problems in public policy discourse (Bagguley and Hussain, 2008: 159-73) . These concerns intensified as part of the government's counter terrorism policy (Brighton 2007; Husband and Alam, 2011; McGhee 2008) , and have dominated public discourse about Muslims so that there is now a constant media pressure to uncover 'what is really happening' in Muslim communities (Werbner 2009: 40) . Increased incidents of racism and Islamophobia were widely feared after the 7/7 attacks. We show that such experiences were more subtle and patterned than these expectations might suggest. Our concern is not with their quantity or severity, but rather with experiences of racism and Islamophobia and how they are interpreted. A further important theme is the distinction between racism and Islamophobia that has received some, but in our view insufficient attention (Modood 2005; Dunn et al. 2007 ). Our aim is not to investigate the complex inter-relations between contemporary racisms, Islamophobia and nationalism.
Rather our goal is to address the kinds of the meaning attributed to experiences of racism and
Islamophobia by British Pakistanis who were living in the critically important locales of Beeston, Dewsbury and the Hyde Park district of Leeds.
We want to suggest that the 'funny looks' in the title of this paper arise out of a fear of 'the stranger' (Bauman, 1991) . After 7/7 in particular it seems that the dominant concern is not with 'Muslims as enemies' but 'Muslims as strangers'. The 7/7 bombers were UK citizens, but their acts were those of 'enemies'. What lies behind the 'funny looks' is the uncertainty that arises when confronted by someone being impossible to classify despite being a familiar and everyday sight. The 7/7 bombings and the reactions to them rendered ordinary Muslims suddenly visible. They became seen as incongruous and ambivalent and therefore offensive to dominant modern western sensibilities, disrupting the assumptions of the viewers. Thus the wearing of Islamic dress becomes stigmatizing; the funny looks are a stigmatizing gaze on Muslims. As only some Muslims, especially women, can be identified as such they carry the 'burden of representation' of the stigmatization of all British Muslims that has emerged since 2001. In our view this illustrate the process by which a '… feature of a certain category of persons is first made salient by being made brought into public attention, and then interpreted as a visible sign of a hidden flaw, iniquity or moral turpitude. An otherwise innocuous trait becomes a blemish, a sign of affliction, a cause of shame. The 4 person bearing this trait is easily recognisable as less desirable, inferior, bad and dangerous'.
(Bauman, 1991: 67).
These developments have given rise to the particular gaze interpreted by some Muslim women in particular as 'the funny looks'. These are very much a 'felt perception' amongst many of our interviewees. Although we did not observe them directly, we might speculate whether they were due partly to the increased self-consciousness of Muslims where they might be projecting others' perceptions of them. However, it was evident from the vivid accounts of them from our interviewees that these were powerful experiences entailing strong perceptions. They were seen as a noticeable development after the 7/7 bombings, especially amongst women who were visible Muslims.
Methods
The data were collected as part of a larger qualitative study of how people from different Interviews were carried out by ethnically and religiously, and in some circumstances gender matched interviewers. All interviewees agreed to be interviewed on condition that they would remain anonymous, and we have used pseudonyms. However, we have retained references to each locality as keeping these anonymous would have been superfluous given the publicity that the locations have already received.
A total of 141 interviews were completed. The highly structured and differentiated nature of the sample means that we have been able to identify patterns and themes within each of the sub-samples. The Pakistani sub-sample that is the basis for the analysis here totalled 18 men and 21 women. The work reported here only pertains to the analysis of the interviews with those from the Pakistani communities in each of the localities. We have carried out a thematic analysis of the data, identifying the issues that emerged from the interviewees' responses to our questions.
Citizenship in question?
British Pakistanis often express hybridised forms of collective identification (Brah 1993; Dwyer 1999a ). However, for Muslims these are increasingly expressed in relation to Islam in 6 response to global political conflicts and British social, cultural and political movements and changes (Hopkins 2007b; Jacobson 1997; Samad 1992 Mahmuda Ali (over 35) from Beeston described herself as a Pakistani Muslim. As an older first generation migrant she did not think of herself of as British. Although she did not retain her Pakistani passport, she was thinking about applying for one as a result of the reaction to the 7/7 bombings: 'I did not before but we are considering it now…' Saira Chadoury (under 35) from the Hyde Park area of Leeds has dual nationality possessing two passports, one Pakistani and the other British. For her this was only a formal designation, rather than an identification of real meaning or emotional substance, implying that it has only been made an issue for her by external circumstances. Her 'English' nationality, as she called it, was a simple fact of where she lives:
It's something that's never actually been an issue for me, to say which one I value more. I have a Pakistani nationality, and I have an English nationality, and to me they are just passports. I live in this county and it's who I am and that's how I see it.
For the older generation there always seems the possibility of returning to Pakistan, but as Rehana Shah (aged over 35) from Dewsbury compared herself to the younger generation: 'They were born here, they've got British passports and this is their home, they can't pack their bags and leave to somewhere which isn't their home'. Part of this emotional attachment to Pakistan amongst the older generation is concerned with the memory of 'home', was also connected to a desire to 'reproduce' and maintain Pakistani culture in a British context (Werbner, 2009 The question of people identifying primarily as Muslim, rather than Pakistani, is not new (Jacobson 1997; Samad 1996) . It has been attributed to the universal and non-ethnic character of the global Muslim umma (Jacobson 1997) , and the increased politicisation of
Islam and Muslims (Samad 1996) . Those born in the UK who self-identified as Muslims Of those who identified themselves as primarily Muslims, some noted how this had changed recently. This illustrates the contextual and mutable character of these collective identifications, especially in response to non-Muslims being more interested in peoples'
religion. In this sense a Muslim identity is being increasingly imposed on people through wider social and political developments (Samad, 1996) . This tendency to increasingly We encountered very few who saw Britishness in entirely negative terms, and these were amongst the older generation with a minority effectively rejecting the notion of Britishness as meaning anything positive as Rehana Shah (over 35) from Dewsbury said: 'British society to me is lager louts, drinking, pub going culture.' Although we found this view mostly amongst the older generation others have found this cultural rejection amongst younger Pakistani
Muslims as well (Hopkins, 2004: 266 Salma Majid also recognized the importance of English as a social skill important to living in the country, although she did not regard it as essential, as her parents had coped without being fluent in English. However, she felt that the policy was really aimed at migrants from the South Asian sub-continent, and did not think that the policy applied to
European migrants who she felt had similar levels of English language competence:
… when our parents came they didn't have much English or anything… I mean the government are quite one sided in one sense because they are looking more towards the Asian continent … you have got a lot of European Union new countries now that are coming in to England and can't even speak the language either, they don't know much about England, they don't know nothing, but it's ok for them, because of, they are from the European Union, it shouldn't work like that. (Salma Majid, under 35,
Dewsbury)
There is both resilience and diversity amongst our interviewees accounts of their citizenship, ethnic and religious identities after the 7/7attacks. We see continued evidence of hybridised identifications with Britain, Pakistan and Islam. In these places after the attacks and the political and media reactions to them (Werbner, 2009) one might have expected to have changed and perhaps become more homogenous. The political reactions to them have added to the salience of Islam for people's identities, and this has reinforced longer term political factors (Samad, 1996; Modood, 2005) . Views about citizenship and English tests were diverse some seeing fluent English as a useful skill, others seeing it as a new form of immigration control aimed at South Asians.
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Perceptions of locality, neighbourhood and segregation
Beeston, Dewsbury and Hyde Park amongst other places developed strongly negative reputational geographies after the 7/7 bombings (Parker and Karner, 2010) . Media and political discourses constructed the places as dysfunctional and creating the 7/7 bombers (Seidler, 2007) . These constructions clashed with the experiences and perceptions of our interviewees. Popular perceptions of localities are the modality through which ethnicity is lived and Islamophobia and racism are experienced. Places are contexts where diverse processes intersect and are lived in different ways (Parker and Karner, 2010) . We found a very strong affirmation of the quality of local life in Beeston, Hyde Park and Dewsbury.
Some younger people described how they had been born and bred in their area, and continued to choose to live there because of the quality of local community life. They often recognised the strength of local South Asian communities, and valued the ethnic, cultural and religious diversity of these places. These were not the 'dysfunctional' communities that have often been described in many policy debates both before and since the bombings:
It's ok. It's not too bad. We've got a close nit community, with the Asian people, there's mixed race there, you get students, you get white people, black people, so it's quite diverse in that sense. (Nadeem Ali, Hyde Park, under 35)
People recognised the impact of the bombings on the image and reputation of the areas, for example Rehana Shaha (aged over 35) described Dewsbury as being: '…on the map now for all the wrong reasons, the July 7 th bombings that put us on the map, with one of the bombers being from here'. However, the positive emotional attachments that local people had to the area mean that they were resistant to the negative wider representations that had recently developed about them: 
Views about the London bombers and suicide bombing.
Media and some academic and policy debates have focused on the apparent level of support or sympathy for the London bombers amongst British Muslims (Field, 2007; Mirza et. al. 2007 ). This evidence has largely come from opinion poll surveys, but they find very limited support for terrorism, rely on very limited samples and give very little insight into the reasoning behind the responses (Field, 2007, p. 468; Mirza et. al. 2007, p. 14) . This is one area where qualitative data such as ours can make a contribution.
We found that our interviewees were highly critical of the bombings, as they saw them as morally wrong, but also because of the wider negative consequences for Pakistani and Muslim communities in Britain. Some did say that they could understand why the bombings were committed, but this was very different from actually supporting them. From men and women, young and old we found moral condemnation of the bombers primarily on the basis of religious beliefs: 'Islam condemns all these either in Britain or all over the world they condemn this'. (Mudassar Bashir, Beeston, over 35)
Our interviewees recalled how the bombings and the whole idea of suicide bombing as a political strategy was condemned in local mosques. People made a distinction between the use of violence for political ends as distinct from non-violent forms of action such as distributing literature and organising demonstrations. In these instances the bombings were seen as being in contravention of the moral codes of Islam, for example: 'I remember going to the Mosque and they were saying suicide bombing it is totally wrong you cannot do it.'
(Iqbal Javed, Dewsbury, under 35).
Another response that many people remarked upon was the unification of the Muslim community. Muslim identity became more important illustrating how such collective identifications are both mutable and contextual and how the political reactions to the 7/7 bombings highlighted Muslim identity. There was a desire to be 'normal Muslims', and this isolates and excludes those involved or supportive of collective political violence. People also wanted to deal with the issues, so that similar events in the future can be avoided:
I think it's brought the whole of the Muslim community together with everything happening, because it's like one out of I don't know how many that has actually done this, and then you see the rest of us, and they are like just doing their normal daily Islamic duties. (Salma Majid, Dewsbury, under 35)
The Muslim community has become more united, because they don't want these things to happen again, and they just want to be together, and to act on it, so that future things like that can be avoided. (Khalid Khan, Dewsbury, under 35) These perspectives contrast with the more simplistic media and political accounts involving an exaggerated and irrational fear not just of Muslims in general, but British Pakistani Muslims in particular (Brighton, 2007; McGhee, 2008; Werbner, 2009 ). Our findings also contrast with opinion poll findings of British Muslims being supportive of the bombings (Field, 2007; Mirza et al, 2007) . This sense of enhanced unity emphasized how ordinary British Muslims were different from the suicide bombers, and cut across differences of gender and generation highlighted by Seidler (2007) .
The new presentation of the racist and Islamophobic self
It is clear that many of those whom we interviewed felt that they experienced a change in the attitude or mood of many non-Muslims towards them -the 'funny looks' referred to in the title of this paper. Furthermore, these experiences were variable especially with respect to location. Where people were perceived as 'strangers' (Bauman 1991, pp. 53-74) , they were more likely to experience 'funny looks'. These can be thought of as 'front-stage'
performances of racist and Islamophobic behaviour (Picca and Feagin 2007) . In response people told us they were often avoiding certain places at certain times, dressing in 'nonMuslim' ways or resisting the 'funny looks' in individualised ways.
The reactions provoked by women who wear the hijab or niqab have given rise to discussions of the gaze in relation to Muslims. In some discussions Muslim women are perceived as 'victims' of an 'exotic patriarchy' that offends liberal Western assumptions (Fortier, 2008) . However, in such a context wearing the hijab, becomes an act of resistance and a source of security against Western male power (Franks, 2000: 920) . The hijab has also become a sign of 'Islamic fundamentalism' in the popular imagination and the object of considerable debate (Fortier, 2008) . Arguably this is now a '… disciplining technology used by non-Muslims against the Muslim population as a whole… ' (Fortier, 2008: 84) .
Almost half of our interviewees reported 'funny looks' and most of these were women. Two more interviewees reported verbal abuse and a racially motivated attack on property. Of the remaining half of the sample, who were mostly male and over 35, two thirds of them had heard of friends and relatives who had experiences ranging from 'funny looks' to direct physical attacks. What is significant in our analysis is the meaning attributed to the 'funny looks' by those of our interviewees who experienced them directly.
People felt that there were certain symbols which seemed to provoke such reactions, such as the carrying of a backpack, or wearing clothing perceived as Islamic. When people were outside of their immediate neighbourhoods in predominantly white spaces, they were more likely to say they experienced these looks. They would come from strangers rather than non-Muslim people they had known for some time and regarded as friends. Anyone recognisably Muslim and carrying a backpack outside of South Asian areas would often draw suspicious looks from non-Muslims:
Well you would just get on the bus sometimes and you get funny looks, because you're carrying a bag, you could be just carrying a shoulder bag and it's like you get funny looks... and that's happened to me a few times, you get on the bus and you just get funny looks. (Saima Khan, Dewsbury, under 35) Ali Mamood from Dewsbury (under 35) talked about how generally strangers react to him: 'They react to you differently, they look at you, stare at you, they take more notice…'
The phrase 'funny looks' captures quite cogently the subtle shift in everyday behavioural Islamophobia or racism since the 7/7 bombings. For those who are identifiably Muslim this was a subtle but noticeable shift in behaviour. Before they would have simply been ignored, but now they had become familiar yet threatening. This has had the effect of producing a shift in the 'presentation of the racist self' (Picca and Feagin 2007) . Using Goffman's analogy they 20 suggest that racist behavior has been moved 'backstage' and is performed in private 'white spaces'. One possible reaction amongst non-Muslims to the 7/7 bombings and the political and media response to them has been to make racist or Islamophobic hostility become more explicit or to move it back to the 'front stage'. As some have put it the political and media response has given people 'permission to hate ' (Poynting and Mason, 2006: 367) . Thus previously hidden 'back stage' racist or Islamophobic performances of some non Muslims have now become the 'front stage' funny looks that our interviewees described to us.
Many of our interviewees made an important distinction between non-Muslim people who were familiar friends and those who they encountered more casually. For instance Nadeem Ali from the Hyde Park district in Leeds told us that her white friends had not really changed in their attitude towards her. However, she went to describe how she felt people she meets more casually reacted: I've always dressed in a westernised way and that obviously hasn't changed, but I do sometimes dress in traditional clothes and when after the bombings I was on a bus and everybody as soon as I got on the bus everybody automatically looked at me, and as I had my bag with me they would look at the bag as well. I was aware of people always staring at me as I was walking past them, they would be doing something and stop what they were doing and always look at you.
Interviewer: Has that put you off wearing Asian dress?
No it has hasn't. That's part of my identity and will never change.
Just as Mariam experienced the 'funny looks' in a public place outside of her community others noted this as well. Whilst within the neighbourhoods where they lived there was no change in how they were viewed, there was elsewhere:
… it's just when you start going out of the community … the way they look at you and their perceptions, mostly when you go in to town maybe, but actually within the community there was no change as such. (Nadeem Ali, Hyde Park, under 35)
In conclusion we see evidence from our interviews of Pakistani Muslims now being seen as strangers (Bauman, 1991) , as familiar but threatening, as physically close but spiritually distant. Women especially have been subject to this gaze (Fortier, 2008) , to these 'funny looks' which represent a shift to a more explicit presentation of a racist or Islamophobic self (Picca and Feagin, 2007) . However, this has been met with both increased self-policing by some and resistance by others. Some think carefully about what they wear and where they go on their own, but others carry on regardless resisting the 'funny looks'. We based the title of this paper on one of the comments from one of our interviews about the 'funny looks' she felt that she experienced in public places after the 7/7 bombings. 
